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The many kinds of objects that 
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Technoscientific objects are penetrating ever more profoundly into the socio-ecological sys-
tems that shape the contemporary lifeworld in ways that have brought about widely cele-
brated benefits, and also many kinds of risks for human health, the environment and society. 
There are many kinds of technoscientific objects, such as physical, chemical or biological 
objects that are outcomes of technical/experimental/instrumental interventions made in 
the course of research conducted in such areas as computer science, biotechnology, nan-
otechnology, neurosciences, geo-engineering, synthetic biology and artificial intelligence. 
Moreover, every technoscientific object is itself an object of many kinds, not only an object 
whose genesis, functioning and effective use are well understood in areas like these, but 
also a social, economic, ecological and cultural object; and, for each kind that the object is, 
there are associated specific causal mechanisms whose operations, when triggered in the 
course of using it in the lifeworld, may lead to effects on and risks for human lives, social 
arrangements and the environment (Section 1). I will illustrate these claims as they apply to 
the exemplary technoscientific objects, transgenics (GMOs) used in agriculture (Section 2). 
Then (Section 3), generalizing the discussion about transgenics, I will argue that appraising 
the value and legitimacy of introducing and using technoscientific objects adequately re-
quires being informed by the results of scientific investigation that take into account all the 
kinds of things that they are, and (to the extent possible) all the causal mechanisms from 
which the effects and risks of using them may arise.  
Keywords: Technoscientific objects, transgenics, ecological and social responsibility.
RESUMO
Objetos tecnocientíficos estão penetrando cada vez mais profundamente nos sistemas so-
cioecológicos que moldam a vida contemporânea de maneira a trazer benefícios amplamen-
te celebrados e também muitos tipos de riscos para a saúde humana, o meio ambiente e a 
sociedade. Existem muitos tipos de objetos tecnocientíficos, como objetos físicos, químicos 
ou biológicos, resultantes de intervenções técnicas/experimentais/instrumentais feitas no cur-
so de pesquisas em áreas como ciência da computação, biotecnologia, nanotecnologia, neu-
rociências, geoengenharia, biologia sintética e inteligência artificial. Além disso, todo objeto 
tecnocientífico é ele próprio um objeto de vários tipos, não apenas um objeto cuja gênese, 
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 1. Technoscientific objects
1.1 Decontextualizing strategies2
The mainstream of the modern scientific tradition 
has fostered research that utilizes methodological ap-
proaches that involve adopting decontextualizing strategies
(DSs). When DSs are adopted, the objects and phenome-
na being investigated are represented in dissociation from 
their human, ecological and social contexts and the pos-
sibilities they may afford by virtue of being parts of those 
contexts, and any links they may have with human agency, 
sensory experience, social arrangements and ethical/social 
value; the theories deployed and empirical data collected 
do not deploy categories, routinely deployed for describing 
and understanding what is experienced and for deliberat-
ing when making decisions, that are value-laden or needed 
for describing contextual or qualitative sensory properties. 
Under the most widely adopted DSs, theories, models and 
hypotheses are constrained so that they are able to repre-
sent objects and phenomena, and encapsulate the possi-
bilities they afford, in terms of their being generated from 
their underlying structures and their components, their 
processes and interactions, and the laws governing them; 
and the empirical data that are selected to be sought for, 
recorded and analysed are largely quantitative, obtained by 
means of interventions made with measuring and record-
ing instruments, and often of phenomena in experimental 
spaces. Thus, e.g., in molecular biology and biotechnology, 
transgenics are investigated for their genomic and molec-
ular biological properties and the effects that are triggered 
by these properties and changes of them; but not for the 
effects of using them on the agroecosystems in which 
they are planted and cultivated and in the specific socio-
economic contexts in which they have been developed, 
produced, marketed and processed, and thus not for the 
impact of using them on, e.g., biodiversity, the viability of 
small-scale farming and worldwide food security.
Throughout the modern scientific tradition, DS-re-
search (i.e., research conducted under DSs) has been close-
ly linked with “the control of nature,” or with technological 
developments (Mariconda, 2010; 2018) and prioritizing the 
values of technological progress [V
TP
]. Adhering to V
TP
 involves 
according high ethical and social value to exercising control 
over natural objects; to expanding human capacities to exer-
cise such control (in technology) in more and more domains 
– including the very small and the molecular biological, over-
coming communication barriers and going to new places in 
space; and to the definition of human, social and ecological 
problems in terms that permit solutions using innovations 
derived from DS-research (Lacey, 2010, p. 37-40).
While closely linked, the trajectories of DS-science 
and technological progress have a measure of independence, 
and some applications of knowledge obtained in DS-science 
serve interests that embody values that are in tension with 
V
TP
. Nevertheless, within the historical trajectory of modern 
science, adopting DSs and adhering to V
TP
 mutually reinforce 
each other by virtue of relations obtaining between them, 
such as that technological developments are furthered by 
being informed by knowledge obtained in DS-research, and 
DS-research often makes use of instruments and equipment 
that are themselves adaptations of technological innovations 
made possible because of advances of DS-research (Lacey, 
1999, p. 117). DS-science may be conducted with the objective 
of generating technological developments and furthering the 
social embodiment of V
TP
. But, it need not be and often has 
not been. Perhaps its most valued results come from investiga-
tions in basic or fundamental research, which aims only to ex-
pand est ablished understanding of the underlying structures, 
constituents, processes, interact ions and laws of phenomena, 
where DS-science is thought to contribute to the common 
heritage of humankind available to be utilized (if and where 
it can be) in service to interests of all value outlooks and not 
favoring any of them at the expense of others. In addition, 
(e.g.) most of the research results compiled by IPCC [Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change] on global warming 
funcionamento e uso efetivo são bem compreendidos em áreas como essas, mas também 
um objeto social, econômico, ecológico e cultural; e, para cada tipo de objeto, existem me-
canismos causais específicos associados cujas operações, quando desencadeadas em seu 
uso no mundo da vida, podem levar a efeitos e riscos para vidas humanas, arranjos sociais e 
meio ambiente (Seção 1). Ilustrarei essas alegações na medida em que se aplicam aos objetos 
tecnocientíficos exemplares, transgênicos (OGM) usados  na agricultura (Seção 2). Então, (na 
Seção 3), generalizando a discussão sobre transgênicos, argumentarei que avaliar adequada-
mente o valor e a legitimidade da introdução e do uso de objetos tecnocientíficos exige que 
se esteja informado pelos resultados da investigação científica que levam em consideração 
todos os tipos de coisas que são, e (na medida do possível) todos os mecanismos causais dos 
quais possam surgir os efeitos e riscos de seu uso.
Palavras-chave: Objetos tecnocientíficos, transgênicos, responsabilidade ecológica e social.
2 This section summarizes ideas developed in Lacey (1999, 2010, 2012, 2014) and Lacey & Mariconda (2014).
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and climate change, concerned with redressing the negative 
effects generated by using technological objects or engaging 
in the act ivities that produce raw materials needed for their 
construction and use, is conducted under DSs. 
1. 2 Technoscience and technoscientific 
objects 
Technoscience is DS-research that is conducted with the 
objective of generating technological developments and further-
ing the social embodiment of V
TP
. It aims directly or indirectly: 
(i) to generate novel technoscientific objects, physical/chemical/bi-
ological objects whose existence is (or depends on) the outcome 
of technical/experimental/instrumental interventions made 
in the course of DS-research, and whose uses can be effectively 
controlled to produce sp ecified effects. And/or (ii) to produce 
knowledge that can inform (and techniques and instruments 
that enable) the genesis, development and production of tech-
noscientific objects, explain their functioning and identify the 
possibilities they afford for implementation in social pract ices 
to bring about sp ecific effects under certain conditions – this is 
knowledge of events and states of affairs of novel domains and 
about new possibilities of what we can do and make; and gener-
ating it makes use of the most advanced technology to produce 
instruments, experimental objects, and new objects and struc-
tures. The aim (i) may be satisfied in the course of, e.g., space 
exploration, testing cosmological or basic physical hypotheses, 
and climate science, although not directly but as “spin-off ” from 
research that needs to utilize objects and instruments that are 
products of technoscientific innovation (that often need to be 
devised as part of the research), and knowledge obtained in this 
research may also be adapted to contribute to realizing aim (ii). 
The science and technology (and basic and applied science) are 
effectively so entangled in technoscience that there is little point 
in attempting to separate them sharply. Furthermore, techno-
scientific objects are valued for their contributions to such areas 
as medicine, agriculture, communications, energy and military 
affairs that, at the same time, contribute to strengthening the 
embodiment of V
TP
 and – since nowadays interests that em-
body values of capital and the market [V
C&M
] have become the 
principal bearers of V
TP
  – also of V
C&M
. Thus, the horizons of 
pract ical, industrial, medical or military uses of technoscientif-
ic innovations, and of economic growth, competition and other 
values of V
C&M
, are usually clearly in view when the priorities of 
technoscientific research are being determined.
It has become commonplace in contemporary scien-
tific institutions to prioritize technoscientific research and, 
for the spokesp ersons of many of them (and esp ecially their 
funding bodies), to identify the trajectory of science with that 
of technoscience and even of commercially-oriented technosci-
ence, i.e., technoscience conducted with the immediate aim 
of producing innovative technoscientific objects that can be 
used to strengthen V
C&M
 (Lacey, 2012).3 Then, the value of 
gaining understanding of the phenomena of nature becomes 
subordinated to that of expanding knowledge of what we can 
do with the technoscientific objects that we can make, and of 
how (using them) we can expand our powers to exercise control
over natural (and technoscientific) objects, esp ecially insofar 
as they can contribute to furthering V
C&M
 and other interests 
of leading commercial bodies.
1.3 The many kinds of things that 
technoscientific objects are 
Technoscience investigates technoscientific objects only 
qua outcomes of technoscientific research, and so objects that 
embody knowledge obtained in DS-research. The impact of 
using technoscientific objects, however, cannot be anticipated 
in all of its details for, when introduced into the lifeworld, they 
may obtain unanticipated uses sometimes in unanticipated en-
vironments; and it extends far beyond the direct outcomes of 
the mechanisms of their internal functioning and producing 
the sp ecific effects desired by those who introduce them into 
the lifeworld and control their use. It includes effects on human 
beings and social and ecological systems – collateral effects of 
using the objects for the sake of producing the effects desired by 
their users – some of which may occur because their efficacious 
functioning depends on their being located in certain kinds of 
environments, whose creation and maintenance requires the 
constant insertion of external inputs and the destruction of 
earlier environments. Many of these effects, because of their 
ecological and social dimensions, cannot be investigated in 
DS-research. To investigate them, one must adopt strategies – 
context-sensitive strategies [CSs] – that do not dissociate from 
these dimensions. CSs have no place in science, when it is con-
ceived as identical to technoscience or necessarily conducted 
under DSs, but they are permitted in science conceived of as 
multi-strategic research [M-SR] (Lacey, 2014; 2016).
In order to understand this multi-dimensional impact as 
fully as possible one must keep in mind that, in addition to be-
ing outcomes of technoscientific research (objects that have 
come into existence as outcomes of technical/experimental/
instrumental interventions made in the course of DS-re-
search), technoscientific objects are also social, economic, 
ecological and cultural objects. They are, e.g., components 
of social/ecological systems that embody V
TP
 and (most of 
them) V
C&M
, as well as values sp ecific to the areas (e.g., medi-
cine) of their intended use.4
3 It is this tendency that explains the recent trend to evaluate the contribution of scientists in terms, not only of the empirical and theo-
retical results they have published but also of patents they have filed and gained (Oliveira, 2013).
4 This statement deploys categories (e.g., referring to embodied values) that have no place in theories and hypotheses investigated 
under DSs, but it is clearly based on empirical evidence.
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In order to identify all the types of objects that tech-
noscientific objects are, it would be necessary to identify 
their causal powers, tendencies, affordances, origins, effects on 
human beings and social/economic/ecological systems, and 
how they differ from natural, non-technoscientific objects and 
other kinds of technoscientific objects. Much of this cannot be 
adequately done within DS-research and so within techno-
scientific research itself. It requires also engaging in CS-re-
search. Thus, the knowledge that underlies the origins of 
technoscientific objects and explains their efficacy (and its 
limits) is not sufficient for understanding all the kinds of ob-
jects that they are and could become. And, technoscientific 
research does not utilize the strategies (CSs) needed to in-
vestigate the mechanisms, connected with technoscientific 
objects qua ecological and social objects (e.g., objects that 
embody V
C&M
), that bring about some of the effects of us-
ing them in the social/ecological systems in which they may 
be used. In the next section, I will illustrate the claims just 
made as they apply to an exemplary class of technoscientif-
ic objects: transgenics, transgenic seeds and plants that are 
actually being used (or whose use is anticipated) in agricul-
tural pract ices that produce foodstuffs.5
2. Transgenics: exemplary 
technoscientific objects
2.1 The kinds of objects that 
transgenics are 
The transgenics that are actually being used in agricul-
tural pract ices are objects of at least the following kinds (cf. 
Lacey, 2010, p. 205; 2017a):
(1) Biological organisms, objects that under appropriate con-
ditions will grow into mature plants from which grain will be 
harvest ed.   
(2) Objects that incorporate scientific knowledge confirmed 
in DS-research in disciplines such as molecular biology, ge-
netics and biotechnology.
(3) Objects whose existence is the outcome of modifying the 
genomes of plants by means of the experimentally-test ed in-
terventions of genetic engineering, most of which currently 
involve techniques of DNA-recombination.
(4) Objects that, when planted, are constituents of agroeco-
systems, whose other constituents include inputs many of 
which are also technoscientific products, e.g., herbicides and 
fertilizers6 that embody V
TP
 and whose functioning depends 
on implementing conditions that embody V
C&M
, e.g., avail-
ability of the required inputs, access to credit so that farmers 
can purchase the needed seeds and inputs, legal enforcement 
of the conditions on their purchase and sale of agricultural 
products and of property rights.
(5) Objects that embody V
TP
.
(6) Objects that embody V
C&M
, for the most part commodities, 
products of agribusiness corporations, brought into existence 
to serve their interests, commercial objects inserted in the mar-
ket (with worldwide dimensions) whose uses are constrained 
by claims of intellectual property rights (Lacey, 2017a).7  
It is by virtue of transgenics being objects of these kinds 
that they have the causal powers, tendencies, affordances, or-
igins, and effects on human beings and social/economic/eco-
logical systems that they have, and are different from natural, 
non-technoscientific objects and other kinds of technoscien-
tific objects. The ontological view presupposed here8 sharply 
conflicts with the reductionist neoCartesian view, according 
to which what objects are (what their charact eristic properties 
are) can in principle be discovered in DS-research. The latter 
view tends to be accepted implicitly by producers of trans-
genics and their allies in government, agricultural pract ices, 
regulatory bodies and scientific institutions, who support the 
widespread use of transgenics and their central role in food/
agricultural public policies. It holds that what transgenics are 
is fully captured by (1)-(3) (perhaps with additional similar 
items); and items (4)-(6) refer only to effects occasioned by 
contingencies of their human uses whose causal origin is not 
in the transgenics themselves. 
There is further controversy connected with (4)-(6). 
Those who hold the neoCartesian view and treat (4)-(6) 
only as contingent generalizations question either their 
truth, or completeness, or significance in connection with ap-
praising the value and legitimacy of using transgenics. They 
make claims like the following: The transgenics used in the 
agroecosystems (described in (4)) also embody the values of 
5 These transgenics are not the only kinds of genetically engineered organisms (GEOs). There are also, e.g., GE microorganisms and 
mosquitos that have nothing directly to do with agriculture, GE fish and animals that have to do with producing foodstuffs, and GE crops 
that produce, e.g., cotton or biofuels, rather than foodstuffs. Many but not all of my comments also apply to them.
6 Transgenics are engineered so that the efficacy of their use requires that they be planted in such agroecosystems. E.g., glyphosate-re-
sistant transgenics are engineered to be used in agroecosystems in which crops are appropriately sprayed with glyphosate.
7 The plants whose genomes are modified (or ancestors of them) were already cultivated in agricultural fields or found in natural ecosys-
tems; but genetically engineered possibilities could not have been realized by means of the mechanisms of natural selection or methods 
of crossbreeding used by traditional and indigenous farmers and conventional plant breeders. Many of them, thus, also incorporate 
the traditional and indigenous knowledge that informed the selection practices that gave rise to them. Note that it is by virtue of being 
objects of kinds (2) and (3) that intellectual property rights can be claimed to transgenics (seeds and plants) – although the knowledge 
obtained under DSs that they incorporate applies to only tiny fragments of their genomes, much larger fragments of which incorporate 
traditional and indigenous knowledge (Lacey, 2010, Chapter 6; 2017a).
8 My formulation of this ontological view, which there is no space to elaborate here, draws on Bhaskar (2014).
Hugh Lacey
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preserving sustainability (e.g., reducing pollution of soils and 
waters) and reducing the health risks of agricultural work-
ers (e.g., less exposure to agrotoxics); by virtue of embodying 
V
TP
 and being sources of food products that are consumed 
by many human beings and animals, they also embody such 
values as safely meeting the food and nourishment needs of 
those who consume them and furthering the realization of 
the right to food security throughout the world; and, by vir-
tue of embodying V
C&M
, they are part of the socioeconomic 
system that furthers the embodiment of V
TP
 with its accom-
panying desirable consequences. Opposing these claims, pro-
ponents of agroecology and food sovereignty maintain that, 
in the agroecosystems and under the socioeconomic condi-
tions in which transgenics are actually used, all other values 
are subordinated to V
C&M
, leading to destructive social and 
environmental consequences, including weakening the wide-
spread realization of the right to food security and massive 
destruction of biodiversity.
DS-research lacks the conceptual/theoretical resources 
to resolve this controversy. Certainly the claims of the pro-
ponents cannot be supported within DS-research: the for-
mulation of items (4)-(6), and of the contingent generaliza-
tions said to replace them as well as the claims stated in the 
previous paragraph, requires categories that have no place in 
theories and hypotheses investigated under DSs; and investi-
gating the effects of using transgenics and their products (and 
the mechanisms that occasion them) on human beings, so-
cial arrangements and ecological systems in the contexts of 
their use is beyond its purview. Addressing the controversy 
requires conducting investigations under appropriate CSs 
that entertain theories and hypotheses that deploy categories 
(e.g., categories apt for describing what values are embodied 
in objects) that are not reducible to those of DSs. Thus, what 
transgenics are – all of the kinds of objects that they are – and 
the full range of the effects of using them cannot be grasp ed 
by means of the same kind of research (conducted under DSs 
in molecular biology and biotechnology) that generated them 
in the first place and that testifies to their efficacy. Neither 
can it be grasp ed that agricultural pract ices, like agroecology 
that embody competing values (of social justice, democratic 
participation and sustainability), would be undermined by 
introducing transgenics into them (Lacey, 2015a; 2015b).9 In 
order to grasp these things, it is necessary to adopt CSs that 
enable the investigation of, e.g., the effects of using transgenics 





Hence, the value and legitimacy of using transgenics 
cannot be adequately appraised when deliberations are car-
ried out deploying only the conceptual framework (limited 
to categories permitted in theories developed under DSs) 
in which the research, development and implementation of 
transgenics take place – or from the demonstrated efficacy of 
using them in the conditions in which they are used, or from 
the stated objectives (or good intentions) of their producers 
and users. It depends also on (i) what their actual benefits 
are, who benefits from them, and whether the benefits can 
be shared evenhandedly; (ii) the safety of using them in the 
agroecosystems of their actual use and under the socioeco-
nomic conditions of their production, distribution, processing 
and consumption – and, hence, on whether or not their actu-
al use has occasioned harm, or is likely to occasion potential 
harmful effects (risks); and (iii) what the viable alternatives to 
using them may be, and how their likely benefits and safety 
compare with those of using transgenics. Appraising the value 
and legitimacy of using transgenics, therefore, requires inves-
tigation concerning these three issues. In this article I will fo-
cus on risks; investigating them requires adopting appropriate 
CSs, as well as DSs.
2.2 The many kinds of risks that using 
transgenics occasions
One of the key premises of arguments defending the 
legitimacy of the central role for transgenics in agricultural 
pract ices and policies is that the current (and anticipated) 
uses of transgenics – their production, planting, cultivation, 
harvesting, processing, distribution and consumption – are 
safe; i.e., that using them occasions no significant risks for 
human health, society and the environment (that cannot 
be managed and contained by implementing and enforcing 
scientifically informed regulations). I will label this claim 
“no risks.” It is said to have a strong basis in empirical inves-
tigations of risks.10 However, the proponents of transgenics 
and official organs, e.g., CTNBio,11 which are responsible for 
making decisions about liberating varieties of transgenics for 
agricultural use, tend to hold the view that transgenics are es-
sentially objects only of the kinds (1)-(3). Their risk analyses, 
consequently, do not take into account all of the kinds of risks 
that are potentially occasioned, but only those occasioned (in 
the words of some scientists who have served on CTNBio), 
by the “direct and sp ecific impact of GMOs [transgenics] 
on nature” (de Andrade et al., 2015). This is the impact de-
rived from using them considered only qua objects of kinds 
(1)-(3), that occasioned by mechanisms triggered by events 
within the modified genomes of the transgenics that can be 
described using categories utilized in DS-research. Investigat-
ing this impact, no matter how well the investigations may be 
conducted, cannot provide sufficient evidence to support “no 
9 For discussion of the CSs used in research in agroecology, see Lacey (2015a).
10 It has been said that there is a scientific consensus supporting “no risks,” at least insofar as it concerns consuming the products de-
rived from transgenics. This is incorrect – see Ferment et al. (2015); Hilbeck et al. (2015); Krimsky (2019)
11 CTNBio – Comissão Técnica Nacional de Biossegurança, the Brazilian body responsible for assessing the safety of transgenics before 
their release for agricultural use.
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risks,” but at most evidence to support the more limited claim: 
“There are no risks of using (esp ecially consuming) transgen-
ics and their products that are occasioned by the ‘direct and 
sp ecific impact of transgenics on nature’.”12 But the more lim-
ited claim could be well confirmed, and at the same time “no 
risks” be disconfirmed by the results of CS-research conduct-
ed on the risks of using transgenics considered qua objects of 
kinds (4)-(6) – and the preponderance of available evidence 
supports that “no risks” is false.
To see this more clearly, consider a particular variety of 
transgenics – call it V (e.g., a variety of soy beans resistant to 
glyphosate). Suppose that it has been convincingly est ablished 
that there are no risks (to health and environment) occa-
sioned by the “direct and sp ecific impact” of V on nature (by 
virtue of mechanisms triggered by events within V’s modified 
genome). Since V is accompanied by inputs of glyphosate in 
the agroecosystems in which it is grown, however, that would 
imply nothing about the safety of planting, cultivating and 
harvesting V. There could be, e.g., health risks occasioned for 
consumers of the processed products of V because of residue 
of the agrotoxics that has not been removed, and for farm 
workers and their communities because of exposure to the 
agrotoxics. These are not idle possibilities. E.g., reports in Ar-
gentina and Brazil (and elsewhere) have documented serious 
health problems occasioned by exposure to glyphosate, the 
main act ive ingredient of the herbicide, Roundup, to which 
the most widely used transgenics have been engineered to be 
tolerant (Carneiro et al., 2015; Gillam, 2017; Paganelli et al,,
2010; Ruschel, 2019). Even if it is well confirmed that there 
are no risks occasioned by events within the modified genome 
of V, that does not suffice to support “no risks,” for there are 
risks occasioned by using V qua object of kind (4). 
Thus, in order to test “using V occasions no risks,” one 
must investigate the effects of using glyphosate as a herbi-
cide in the fields where the glyphosate-resistant V is grown. 
It is not an adequate substitute to follow procedures that 
require analyzing the effects of using transgenics and gly-
phosate separately – where the effects of growing and con-
suming V are investigated in laboratory or small-scale field 
studies in which V is grown without using glyphosate, and 
the effects of consumption of and exposure to glyphosate in 
other investigations – unless there were empirical evidence 
supporting that there are no additional or interact ing fac-
tors that might affect the safety of using V. V, used in con-
texts different from those of its normal agricultural use, may 
be safe; but that has no implications for its safety where it is 
encountered by human beings in the agroecosystems of its 
actual use. V was developed to be resistant to glyphosate so 
that it could be grown in agroecosystems in which glypho-
sate would be an act ive presence, and it has no agricultural 
uses otherwise; and glyphosate is present in those agroeco-
systems because V is being grown there; and any effects its 
use may occasion in them are a consequence of its associa-
tion with V. V, in the agroecosystems in which it is actually 
used, is an object of kind (4). Nevertheless, according to De 
Andrade et al. (2015), the mandate of CTNBio is confined 
to analyzing the “direct and sp ecific impact” of transgenics; 
appraising the effects of using agrotoxics (e.g., glyphosate) in 
managing transgenic crops is outside of its mandated pur-
view; and risk assessment of using agrotoxics, a matter that 
has to do with “other asp ects of the technology,” needs to be 
(and is) conducted by other bodies.13 Moreover, according 
to this article, separating the procedures involved in analyz-
ing the two kinds of risks (those deriving from the direct 
and sp ecific impact of transgenics on nature, and those from 
other asp ects of the technology) is part of a “technical stance 
accepted and deployed throughout the world in accordance 
with international treaties and accords concerning com-
merce and protection of health and the environment” (au-
thor’s translation), a stance that would be reasonable only if 
transgenics were objects only of kinds (1)–(3), and if safety 
studies of using them need only take into account risks that 
may be occasioned by virtue of transgenics being objects of 
these kinds.14
In addition to the risks of using transgenics consid-
ered qua objects of kind (4), there are also risks (and harm 
that may have already occurred) occasioned by mecha-
nisms triggered by using them qua objects of kinds (5) and 
(6). They include environmental risks: e.g., loss of biodi-
versity due to planting transgenics in monocultures, and 
degradation of soils (elimination of microorganisms and 
fungi in them) and water supplies because of intensive and 
prolonged use of agrotoxics. And social risks: e.g., threats 
to the food security of those who lose their lands because 
of the expansion of agribusiness that fosters the use of 
transgenics, monopolization of the world’s seed markets, 
and undermining of alternative approaches to agriculture 
(e.g., agroecology) and conditions that favor ensuring food 
security for poor communities (Holt-Giménez, 2019).15
These risks are occasioned by growing all the varieties of 
12 Because of risks that were detected, some varieties of transgenics were not liberated for use. So, a more accurate formulation would 
be: “There are no risks of these kinds that cannot be detected in DS-investigations, and none have been detected concerning the vari-
eties that have been liberated for agricultural use; and risk assessments of these kinds made before liberating new varieties are likely to 
detect in advance any serious risks, so that risk-incurring varieties would not be released.”
13 De Andrade et al. (2015) is a response to Lacey et al. (2015a), and is responded to in Lacey et al. (2015b).
14 For those who identify “scientific” methodologies in terms of using only DSs, studies of this kind are considered to be “scientific 
risk (or safety) studies” and CS-research is not considered to have sound scientific credentials. It is sometimes maintained that the de-
liberations of regulatory organs should be informed only by the results of “scientific” studies. I have argued elsewhere (Lacey, 2019a) 
that this view of scientific methodology is a significant cause of maintaining ignorance about the serious risks occasioned in the light of 
transgenics being objects of types (4)-(6).
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transgenics currently liberated for use, and exacerbated by 
the totality and extent of plantings of them and by the ag-
gressive introduction of their processed products into the 
world’s food system in programs shaped by agribusiness, 
food companies and policies of governments and interna-
tional trade bodies (Lacey, 2017b).
When only the two-track procedure (described in de 
Andrade et al., 2015) is followed, sound endorsements of the 
safety of using transgenics cannot be made. Even if it were 
soundly est ablished that there are no risks deriving from the 
“direct and sp ecific impact” of using them, that does not es-
tablish that it is safe to use them in the agroecosystems in 
which they are used under the conditions of their use, and to 
consume their products. Following that procedure, and effec-
tively appraising the safety of using transgenics only qua ob-
jects of the kinds (1)–(3), may serve the interests of agribusi-
ness and some of its clients that profit from the production 
and uses of transgenics, and governments that encourage the 
growth of crops for export. But it fails to address adequately 
issues of safety that arise in the agroecosystems of their use, 
e.g., about the harmful effects on the health of farmers and 
communities that become exposed to agrotoxics, and it leads 
to rejecting the rationale for taking precautionary measures 
aimed at preventing or minimizing the impact of the harmful 
effects (Lacey, 2019a).   
Agribusiness and its allies sometimes point out that the 
risks occasioned by mechanisms connected with transgenics 
being objects of kinds (4)–(6) are also occasioned in “conven-
tional” farming (based on using hybrids, agrochemicals in-
cluding agrotoxics and intense mechanization) by essentially 
the same kinds of ecological and socioeconomic mechanisms; 
that these risks predated the introduction of transgenics; and 
that they are still occasioned in situations where “convention-
al” farming is not replaced by transgenics. Hence, they con-
clude, it is just “ideological” to attribute these risks to using 
transgenics. It is true that risks of these kinds are endemic to 
the hegemonic food/agricultural system, that in other (earli-
er) situations there are different mechanisms for occasioning 
them, and that the role that transgenics have come to play in 
shaping the trajectory of the system is explained by the inter-
ests well served by the system. Nevertheless, these facts do 
not challenge that currently mechanisms connected with us-
ing transgenics play the central role in occasioning these risks. 
Furthermore, proponents of using transgenics have 
maintained that risks like these are more than counterbal-
anced by the benefits obtained, since (they claim)  there are 
no alternatives to the agricultural use of transgenics (and 
their technoscientific successors) that would not occasion 
worse risks, e.g., the risk of not producing enough food to 
feed and nourish the world’s population. But no alternatives
cannot be investigated without adopting CSs, for to confirm 
it, research would have to be conducted on the possibilities 
of farming pract ices like agroecology whose core pract ices 
are not principally informed by knowledge obtained under 
DSs.16 As things stand, no alternatives has not been est ab-
lished in the course of empirical investigations, and the pre-
ponderance of evidence (obtained in CS-research) is against 
it (Lacey, 2015b; 2017a; 2017b).
It matters that transgenics are objects of many kinds. 
Thinking of them as objects only of the kinds (1)–(3) helps 
to consolidate the myth that transgenics may be used to serve 
interests linked with virtually any values (Lacey, 2017a). Not 
recognizing that they are also objects of kinds (4)–(6) enables 
misleading judgments to be made about what can be expect-
ed from using transgenics on a wide scale (Lacey, 2017b); and 
it leads to ignoring the possibilities of non-technoscientific al-





but the values of social justice, participatory democracy and 
environmental sustainability (Lacey, 2015a; 2015b).
3. The value and legitimacy 
of introducing and using 
technoscientific objects
Transgenics are exemplary technoscientific objects 
(Lacey, 2017a); consequently, although most technoscientif-
ic objects are not biological objects, much of the discussion 
about transgenics can be generalized to technoscientific ob-
jects in general. Technoscientific objects being used in the 
lifeworld can be shown one-by-one to be themselves objects 
of many kinds, including ecological and social objects; and ap-
praising their value and legitimacy requires considering and 
investigating them qua all the kinds of objects that they are.  
Just as transgenics are not only objects of kinds (1)–(3), 
other kinds of technoscientific objects are not only physical/
chemical/biological objects that have come into existence as 
outcomes of technical/experimental/instrumental interven-
tions made in the course of DS-research. And, just as trans-
genics are objects of kinds (4)–(6), they too are objects of 
daily life, human experience, social arrangements, productive 
act ivities, and institutional pract ices. Moreover, since their 
functioning in social pract ices requires that certain material, 
ecological and social conditions be in place (e.g., availability of 
necessary inputs for their functioning, and the socioeconomic 
structures that ensure their continued availability), they are 
also components of social/ecological systems that embody 
V
TP
 and (typically) V
C&M
, as well as values sp ecific to the ar-
eas of their intended uses. Establishing and maintaining the 
15 Also, recent increases in obesity and other health problems have been attributed to programs that lead to expansion of consumption 
of ‘junk foods’, programs made more efficient by processing transgenics (Jacobs & Richtel, 2017).
16 Perhaps DS-research might suffice to establish “no alternatives within the trajectory of the hegemonic food/industrial system,” but no 
alternatives does not follow from this. Agroecology, e.g., is an alternative in tension with this trajectory (Lacey, 2015b).
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conditions, as well as using the technoscientific objects where 
they obtain, has material, ecological, human, economic and 
social effects. Many of them are of ethical significance, and so 
need to be taken into account in deliberations concerning the 
value and legitimacy of using technoscientific objects. This is 
esp ecially important when they are introduced supposedly as 
parts of solutions to social problems – as introducing trans-
genics is said by its proponents to contribute to solving the 
problem of worldwide hunger – for maintaining the condi-
tions might be incompatible with solving the problem. Critics 
of using the transgenics currently in use and development, 
e.g., have argued that agribusiness control of the food/agricul-
tural system is incompatible with eliminating hunger in poor 
areas of the world (Lacey, 2015b; 2017b; see note 18). And 
many people directly affected by the consequences of climate 
change, pollution and destruction of biodiversity worry that 





 are highly embodied in the hegemonic institutions and 
social pract ices (to the detriment of the values of social jus-
tice, democratic participation and environmental sustainabil-
ity) is incompatible with mitigating problems like these that 
threaten the future of humanity. 
These matters cannot be investigated adequately in 
technoscience itself where only DSs are adopted, or discussed 
in ways that are informed by appropriate scientific input in 
contexts where technoscientific objects are considered only 
qua objects that are products of technoscientific research, 
and not also as objects qua constituents of social-ecological 
systems, objects that embody V
TP
 and typically V
C&M
. Since 
modern science privileges the adoption of DSs (leading to the 
virtual exclusion of CSs), these matters have not been ade-
quately investigated in modern science. That partly accounts 
for the fact that climate change was not foreseen as a poten-
tial consequence of the widespread introduction into social 
pract ices of the technoscientific objects (given the economic 
conditions of their implementation and maintenance) whose 
uses occasion large greenhouse gas emissions; and how to mit-
igate the effects of climate change will not be adequately in-
vestigated so long as that trajectory of science is largely iden-
tified with that of technoscience (or commercially-oriented 
technoscience).
The privileged place granted to adopting DSs is linked 
with the widespread social adherence to V
TP
, the profound 
embodiment of V
TP
 in modern social institutions, and not 
systematically subordinating V
TP
 to interests connected with 
ethical and social values other than (sometimes) V
C&M
 (Lacey, 
2010, Chapter 1; Lacey & Mariconda, 2014). Thus, adhering 
to V
TP
 easily leads to according prima facie legitimacy to im-
plementing demonstrably efficacious technoscientific inno-
vations without delay (considering them only qua outcomes 
of technoscientific research) so that the expected benefits of 
using them may be obtained as quickly as possible, and even to 
tolerating a considerable measure of social and environmental 
disruption for its sake – provided only that, following inves-
tigations (conducted under DSs) of their “direct and sp ecific 
impact” on health and environment, appropriate experts or 
official organs (like, in the case of transgenics, CTNBio) judge 
that they would not occasion serious risks (Lacey, 2016). This 
presumption of legitimacy – untest ed by the consideration of 
risks that need CSs for their investigation – is strengthened 
when V
TP
 are interpreted (in commercially-oriented techno-
science) in the light of V
C&M
. 
In the dominant social, economic and political institu-





often taken for granted. This helps to explain why it is large-
ly ignored that technoscientific objects are objects of many 
kinds and that there are potential risks of using them that 
are occasioned by virtue of all the kinds of objects that they 
are, and why research conducted under CSs is marginalized. 
Nevertheless, this explanation should not disguise that it is 
reasonable to adhere to V
TP
 only if claims like the following 
can be endorsed following relevant empirical investigation 
(Lacey, 2010, p. 39): (a) On-going technoscientific innova-
tion expands human potential and provides benefits that can 
be made available to all human beings. (b) Technoscientific 
solutions can be found for virtually all pract ical problems (in 
medicine, agriculture, communications, transportation, ener-
gy provision, etc.), including those occasioned by the “collat-
eral effects” of using technoscientific objects themselves. (c) 
For most of these problems there are only technoscientific 
solutions. (d) The values of technological progress represent 
a set of universal values that must be part of any viable value 
outlook today – there are no viable alternatives.
Items (a)–(d) are not value judgments. They are claims 
open to being test ed empirically in investigations that (giv-
en their social, historical and value asp ects) would require 
the adoption of relevant CSs. Thus they fall outside of the 
purview of technoscience.17 When technoscientific objects 
are recognized as being the many kinds of objects that they 
are, and the relevant CSs are adopted, available facts provide 
grounds for not hastily assuming that (a)–(d) would with-
stand systematic empirical scrutiny. Re (a): the benefits of 
technological “progress” to date have not been made available 
to many poor and indigenous peoples. Re (b): technoscien-
tific solutions proposed to address world hunger (including 
using transgenics) have not delivered (Lacey, 2015b) and 
those proposed to mitigate climate change remain mired in 
ambiguity; and none are available to address the risks of using 
17 Ironically (and perhaps paradoxically), investigating presuppositions of marginalizing CSs requires adopting CSs.
18 Accompanying (b) there is often the unarticulated assumption that to produce solutions to problems it is not necessary to know about 
the causal network that has produced them and sustains them. Those who propose that using transgenics is key to solving the problem 
of world hunger rarely address the socioeconomic causes of hunger, and so do not address how hunger can be redressed adequately 
without eliminating those causes.
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transgenics considered qua objects of kinds (4)–(6).18 Re (c): 
there is promising evidence that agroecology (an approach to 
farming whose essentials are not informed by technoscience) 
is the key to moving towards addressing the problem of hun-
ger (Lacey, 2015a). Re (d): pract ices that embody the values 
of social justice, resp ect for the full range of human rights, 
environmental sustainability and democratic participation 
(embodied in agroecological and associated pract ices in other 
areas, as well as many popular social movements throughout 
the world, including in Brazil) constitute prosp ectively a vi-






All of these issues are obscured when it is ignored that 
technoscientific objects are objects of many kinds. In contrast, 





 all become matters of contest ation, and the ground is 
undercut for the casual assumption of the value and legitima-
cy of using technoscientific innovations, provided only that 
DS-scientific investigations show that their “direct and sp ecif-
ic impact” does not involve seriously harmful effects. Then, it 
becomes apparent that appraising the value and legitimacy of 
using technoscientific innovations needs to take into account 
(to the extent possible) all the risks of using them, that risks 
might be occasioned by mechanisms grounded in any of the 
kinds of things that they are, and that the seriousness of the 
risks needs to be evaluated in the light of what alternatives are 
and could be available. This requires going beyond the limits 
of technoscience and being responsive to research conducted 
under CSs (as well as DSs). It also requires taking precaution-
ary measures to ensure that an innovation is not introduced 
into the lifeworld unless a sufficient range of risks and alter-
natives has been investigated. These measures are needed to 
make time available in order to develop the conceptual re-
sources required in the investigations, to deal with the threats 
of climate change (and other threats, such as those derived 
from using transgenics and their successors), and to allow 
for democratically supported alternatives to demonstrate 
whatever promise they might have – so that further harm 
that may be occasioned by using technoscientific innovations 
could be minimized (if not eliminated).20 Thus (see Lacey, 
2016; 2019a), responsibly appraising the value and legitima-
cy of using technoscientific innovations requires, on the one 
hand, that research conducted in technoscience be accompa-
nied by commensurate research (deploying appropriate CSs) 
on the long-term, often worldwide, potentially irreversible 
ecological and social consequences of introducing the inno-
vation into the lifeworld, taking into account all of the kinds 
of objects that the innovations are and the socioeconomic 
conditions of the planned introductions and the actual condi-
tions of use; and, on the other hand, that adequate research be 
conducted that investigates the full array of alternatives that 
are proposed by participants in democratic societies.   
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